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Abstract: 
This paper provides experimental estimates of the impact of a voucher for private 
care within the Nordic system of universal provision of public care.  The private 
childcare voucher acted as a significant boost for new childcare entrepreneurs to 
enter the market thus increasing the overall childcare provision in the municipalities 
participating in the experiment.  In a market that was providing high-quality, low-
cost public childcare, a voucher is nevertheless found to have a significant, positive 
effect for the use of private childcare with zero to negligible effects on the use of 
public care and labour force participation.   
Keywords: Social experimentation, vouchers, childcare use, labour force 
participation 
JEL Codes: H42, J2, J13 
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1. Introduction 
Research on different ways of financing childcare is long overdue.  Several 
European countries spend a large proportion of their GDP public childcare provision 
ranging from about 1 ½ per cent of GDP in Finland to 2 ¼ per cent of GDP in 
Denmark. However, the ageing population among other issues is putting a strain on 
the financing of all publicly subsidized welfare services. Bringing in elements of 
competition, for example, in the form of quasi-markets may increase the efficiency 
of the childcare market (Steuerle et al., 2000).  This paper relies on an experimental 
setting to evaluate the impact of increased private provision due to a private childcare 
voucher on labour force participation and use of private and public childcare in a 
market that is already providing high-quality, low-cost public childcare.    
Evidence points to the private childcare voucher resulting in an exogenous shift 
in the supply of private childcare places in the treated areas.  The results indicate that 
the voucher for private care has a significant, positive effect (3-5 percentage points) 
for the use of private care, especially in areas that suffer from excess demand for 
childcare services (6-7 percentage points).  Weak evidence points to increased labour 
force participation and use of public care, as well as increased private care use, 
within areas that initially reported excess demand for childcare. 
The next section explains the voucher experiment in more detail while section 3 
outlines the econometric method used in the analysis.  Section 4 includes a 
description of the data.  The results are presented in section 5 while section 6 
concludes. 
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2. The Finnish voucher experiment 
The childcare is provided by municipalities, which finance it through 
municipality taxes and contributions from the central government.  However, the 
payment by the consumers of childcare only covers approximately 15% of the total 
cost of childcare1.  The high level of public expenditure has led to pressures to 
enhance its effectiveness (Hemmings et al., 2003).  The large public provision of 
childcare has led to an inefficient outcome where many municipalities suffer from 
excess demand while at the same time others experience excess supply according to 
the Finnish Ministry of Social Services and Health.     
By the beginning of 1995, 33 municipalities, out of 450, reported wanting to take 
part in a voucher experiment for private childcare and all were accepted2.  Out of the 
33 participating municipalities, 13 were cities and half of the remaining participants 
were small municipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants.  Six municipalities are 
excluded from the analysis due to inconsistencies in their participation, for example, 
a few municipalities started the voucher experiment before others in 1994. 
Each municipality pays a subsidy to the private childcare provider chosen by the 
family.  The amount of the subsidy varies by municipality.  The private childcare 
providers face the same laws regarding child-staff ratios and educational 
                                                 
1 Users pay a means-tested fee, which is fixed by the municipality, of up to €168 per 
child (in 1998).   
2 21 municipalities chose a means-tested voucher (€140-366/month/child for 0-2 year 
olds; €128-343/month/child for 3-6 year olds) while 12 municipalities gave out a 
lump-sum voucher (€304/month/child on average for 0-2 year olds; 
€263/month/child on average for 3-6 year olds). 
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requirements of the staff as publicly provided childcare and are regularly inspected 
by the municipality3.  However, families choosing the voucher and using privately 
provided childcare, on average, and perhaps subjectively, valued the quality to be 
better than those using public care4.   
On average, the voucher cost €50 less per child per month than the publicly 
provided care.  While the private care accounted for approximately 6% of all 
childcare provision, the average costs for the municipalities were only 1.5% of total 
childcare spending.  The cost of private care provision is between 60% and 90% of 
the comparative public care. 
Vouchers in general increase consumer choice, and hence increased consumer 
satisfaction, and may therefore lead to increased competition between providers 
(Steuerle et al., 2000)5. In fact, the private childcare voucher had a major boost on 
the supply of care; 22% of the private childcare entrepreneurs who were in operation 
in 1998 started operating at the start of the voucher experiment.  Of the entrepreneurs 
that started their business during the experiment, 59% reported that the reason for 
starting was the private childcare voucher according to the Finnish Ministry of Social 
Services and Health.  The experiment ended in 1997 and private childcare subsidy 
                                                 
3 Average child/staff ratio is 4.2 in childcare centres and 2.8 in childminder care. 
4 The subjective quality is reported to be better in the private sector in terms of co-
operation between the family and the childcare centre.  Public care was considered 
especially good in terms of food, rest and safety. 
5 However, Besharov and Samari (2000) note the importance of calibrating the 
childcare voucher payments to the local market conditions to prevent subsidies meant 
for low-income families to benefit more affluent families or increasing profits for 
providers.   
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was adopted nationally.  By 2002, a fifth of all childcare centres (approximately 
3,000 in total) in Finland were private enterprises accounting for about 6% of all 
childcare places6. 
Overall, the universal public provision led to excess supply of childcare at the 
national level.  Thus, our estimates provide a lower bound estimate for most 
countries where excess demand is experienced nationally.  However, many 
municipalities in the experiment (including three in the capital region) experienced 
excess demand.  Hence using this information we can also evaluate the impact of the 
voucher under the conditions of demand outstripping the supply of childcare 
services. 
3. Econometric method 
Exogenous variation induced by, for example, a policy change in the main 
explanatory variables is especially useful in situations in which the estimates are 
ordinarily biased by omitted variables or selection bias (Meyer, 1995).  Studies based 
on experiments also avoid any strict behavioural assumptions.   
To estimate the effect of the voucher on the use of childcare and labour force 
participation of mothers, I rely on propensity score matching, pairing mothers with 
similar observed characteristics in the treated and non-treated areas.  Propensity 
score matching highlights the support problem in a way that is often overlooked in a 
regression analysis.  The lack of common support may lead to biased estimates of the 
                                                 
6 The Finnish Ministry of Social Services and Health interviewed municipality 
representatives after the experiment finished in 1997 and found that private childcare 
is available in 85% of the bigger municipalities (over 10,000 inhabitants) and 53% of 
the smaller municipalities (less than 10,000 inhabitants). 
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effect of the treatment on the treated (see Heckman et al., 1997 for details).  Hence, it 
is crucial that the common support is as large as possible otherwise the matching is 
done on the tails of the two distributions i.e. matching individuals that are quite 
different than the rest of the population.   
A primary assumption underlying matching is the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA), which states that the treatment status is random conditional on a 
set of observable characteristics X.  The CIA will be satisfied if X includes all of the 
variables that affect both participation and outcomes (see, for example, Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983).  Rather than matching on X it is equivalent to match on P(X), thus 
avoiding the problem of dimensionality. 
All matching estimators can be written as follows: 
∑
=
=
J
j
jjii YXPXPwXPYE
1
00 ))(ˆ),(ˆ())(ˆ|(ˆ      (1) 
,where subscript i denotes treated individuals and j indexes the untreated comparison 
group observations.  The matching estimator constructs an estimate of the 
unobserved counterfactual for each treated observation by taking a weighted average 
of the outcomes of the untreated observations.  The difference between the various 
matching estimators lies in the type of weighting placed on the jth observation in 
constructing a counterfactual for the ith treated observation. 
This paper uses two alternative matching estimators: the nearest neighbour 
estimator and the Epanechnikov kernel matching estimator.  The nearest neighbour 
matching estimator assigns the weight of 1 to the comparison observation with the 
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closest propensity score to each treated observation and 0 to all other observations7.  
The nearest neighbour estimator does not impose a support condition but instead 
constructs a counterfactual for every treated observation no matter how large the 
distance is to the propensity score of the nearest comparison group observation.  
Hence, to overcome this potential problem, the nearest neighbour estimator is 
combined with a caliper.  A caliper defines an interval around each treated unit 
within which the propensity score of a control individual should lie for it to be 
included in the estimation.  The nearest neighbour matching in this paper is done 
with replacement8.      
Rather than relying on a single control, it is possible to construct a synthetic 
individual based on a group of control individuals.  The weight attached to each 
control is given by a kernel.  The kernel matching potentially assigns a non-zero 
weight to several observations in the comparison group in constructing the 
counterfactual for each treated observation9.  
                                                 
7 The weighting for the nearest neighbour matching estimator takes the following 
form:    (2) ⎪⎩
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8 Matching without replacement keeps variance low at the cost of potential bias while 
matching with replacement keeps bias low at the cost of larger variance. 
9 The standard form for the weighting function is given by: 
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where K(.) is a kernel function and an is a bandwidth.  This paper uses the 
Epanechnikov kernel which takes the following form:  
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Asymptotically, all the matching estimators produce the same estimate because 
they all end up comparing only exact matches.  However, in finite samples, different 
matching estimators produce different results because of the variation in the 
weighting (see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002 for details)10.   
A further threat to the validity of the estimates results from the fact that the 
experiment determines partial equilibrium effects.  In other words, the impact of the 
treatment is estimated when only a proportion of the population is treated.  The 
following estimation assumes no general equilibrium effects i.e. that the persons 
outside the experimental treatment area are not affected by the treatment.  In the 
statistics literature this assumption is called the stable unit treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA).  The results may be different when the full population is 
treated, however, this issue is not dealt with in this paper. 
4. Data description 
The estimation uses data from the Income Distribution Survey11 (referred to as 
IDS from hereon) from 1994 until 1997.  The IDS is a rotating panel survey 
interviewing 10,000 households per year.  Each household is interviewed for two 
consecutive years.  The interview data is linked with data from administrative 
                                                                                                                                          
⎩⎨
⎧ <−=
otherwise
if
K
0
1||)1(
)(
2
4
3 ψψψ       (4) 
10 The choice of the matching estimator depends on the data.  For many and evenly 
distributed comparison observations, the multiple nearest neighbour provides the best 
estimates while for many and asymmetrically distributed comparison observations 
kernel matching may be the best choice.  Local linear matching should be used when 
there are many observations with the propensity score near zero or one. 
11 Tulonjakotilasto in Finnish. 
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registers, for example, on income and subsidies.  All the data are provided on an 
annual basis, for example, employment participation is reported as months per year. 
The information on the municipality of residence is not released in the IDS due to 
confidentiality reasons.  Instead Statistics Finland has, on request, created dummies 
to identify the experimental regions including any variation in the type of voucher. 
The childcare voucher experiment was administered between 1.3.1995 and 
31.7.1997.  Hence the pre-treatment period is 1994.  The experiment began on 
1.3.1995 hence the first two months of the year are not affected by the experiment.  
Similarly, in 1997 the last five months of the year are not affected by the experiment.  
However, this should not affect the estimation results and any bias resulting from the 
time frame should reduce the coefficient estimates. 
 [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The estimating sample includes all the mothers with pre-school age children 
(aged 0-6) who are married or cohabiting and whose partner works12 (see Table 1 for 
details).  Some regions were dropped from the sample because they do not represent 
either the control or the treatment region, for example, in some cases the private 
childcare voucher was used prior to the start of the experiment.  Single mothers are 
not used in the analysis because of the small sample sizes, especially for the 
treatment region.  The unit of observation is a pre-school age child, hence each 
mother observation is weighted by the number of pre-school age children.  The 
standard errors are corrected to account for clustering at individual level  The sample 
size for 1994-97, inclusive, is 6,651, of which 2,618 are mothers of 0-2 year old 
                                                 
12 Non-employed fathers are dropped from the analysis because of the requirement to 
work in one type of voucher. 
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children and 4,033 are mothers of 3-6 year old children.  The sample used in the 
analysis further drops 1,525 observations from the pre-experiment period (1994). 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics separately for the control region G=0 and 
the treatment region G=1 prior to the start of the experiment (1994).  Column 3 of 
Table 2 reports the results of a test for differences in the means between the control 
and the treatment region.  There are no significant differences in the working status 
of the control and treatment region, however, the use of private and public childcare 
are 7 percentage points lower in the control region compared to the treated region 
before the start of the experiment.  Another significant difference between the control 
and the treatment region is the level of unemployment, which is almost 6 percentage 
points higher in the control region13.  Significant difference exists also for the size of 
the household.     
There are significant differences in the level of education between the control and 
the treated region for both mothers and fathers of the pre-school age children.  
Mothers are more likely to have finished their schooling at the baccalaureate level in 
the control region whereas, in the treated population, significantly more women have 
acquired at least a Masters degree.  A similar trend is observed for fathers’ level of 
education.  Therefore on average the treated region is more educated.  These 
differences are partly due to the fact that the capital region accounts for about 50% of 
                                                 
13 Unemployment figures are included in the analysis since VATT estimates that 1% 
decrease in average unemployment rate increases the demand for childcare by 2,500 
places. 
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the treated areas and that there is over 30 percentage point difference in the 
proportion of rural municipalities between the two groups.  
Throughout the analysis, the main variables of interest are labour force 
participation, use of public care and use of private care (referred to as LFP, PUB and 
PRIV, respectively, from hereafter).  Employment participation in the IDS is 
provided only as months worked per year.  Similarly, the use of childcare is reported 
as months per year for each type of care.  LFP takes the value 1 if the individual has 
worked at least one month a year either full-time, part-time or as an entrepreneur14.  
Similarly, the binary variables for PUB and PRIV take the value 1 for those who 
have used any public or private childcare services, respectively.  Sensitivity analysis 
is conducted using six months and twelve months as the cut-off points, however, this 
has no significant impact on the results15.   
The family benefits and maternal and paternal leave are more generous for 
parents with children below three years old than for parents with older pre-school age 
children.  Hence the consequent kink in the budget constraint motivates the 
examination separately for 0-2 and 3-6 year olds.   
 To account for the possible bias due to self-selection of municipalities into the 
treatment discussed in Section 3, we estimate the voucher effect with propensity 
score matching.  The propensity score matching estimation uses information from the 
period of experimentation (1995-1997).   
                                                 
14 The share of part-time employees is only slightly higher than 10% among female 
employees and hence no difference between full-time and part-time employment is 
taken into account in the estimation. 
15 The results are available from the author upon request. 
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The matching methods include the nearest neighbour and the Epanechnikov 
kernel estimation with caliper/bandwidth values of 0.1, 0.01, and 0.005.  The 
common support is examined both graphically and with appropriate test statistics.     
 The propensity score is estimated with a probit where the covariates are 
mother’s and father’s age and their level of education, interaction of mother’s and 
father’s age, the household size, age of the youngest child, number and age of pre-
school children, age of the pre-school age child interacted with father’s and mother’s 
age, interaction between the number of pre-school age children and the age of the 
youngest child, father’s earnings, father’s earnings interacted with the size of 
household, father’s trade union status and year dummies. 
Finally, it is possible to identify three municipalities within the experiment region 
that suffer from excess demand for childcare16.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
identify similar excess demand regions within the control area due to data 
confidentiality reasons. 
5. Empirical results 
The results for the whole country are reported in section 6.1 while section 6.2 
presents the analysis for parts of the country that experienced excess demand for 
childcare prior to the start of the experiment.   
 
 
                                                 
16 These municipalities are identified as suffering from excess demand for childcare 
by the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health in Finland in their publication “Lasten 
päivähoitoselvitys – syyskuu 1997”. 
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5.1 Whole country 
The propensity score matching estimates for the impact of the private childcare 
voucher experiment are presented in Table 3. The distribution of propensity scores is 
reported in Figure 1.  The top histogram corresponds to the treated (G=1) group, 
while the bottom histogram corresponds to the control (G=0) group.  In these 
histograms, each bin has a width of 0.05.  Figure 1 shows that there is thick support 
providing strong identification throughout the distribution of propensity scores. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 reports propensity score matching estimates of the impact of the private 
childcare voucher for the whole country.  Nearest neighbour matches are reported 
with a caliper of 0.1, 0.01 and 0.005. Similarly, kernel estimates use a bandwidth of 
0.1, 0.01 and 0.005.  As indicators of match quality, the table reports the proportion 
of matched treated observations and, as an indicator of the thickness of the common 
support, the number of control observations accounting for 50% of the matches17.  
When a few controls are used several times, the precision of the estimates suffers 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2002).  Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap with 100 
replications.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
None of the estimates for the younger age group are significant.  On the other 
hand, for the older age group the use of private childcare has increased significantly 
as a result of the experiment.  The nearest neighbour kernel gives a 3-4 percentage 
                                                 
17 These statistics are reported for the nearest neighbour estimates only but they are 
the same for the Epanechnikov kernel estimates. 
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point increase for the use of private childcare, while using the Epanechnikov kernel 
the impact increases to up to 5 percentage points.  Even the nearest neighbour 
estimates with a caliper of 0.005 results in over 95% of common support with 176 
observations accounting for 50% of the matches.       
The estimates for LFP and PUB are not significantly different from zero, hence 
the new entrants to private care were previously using informal childcare while being 
employed.  
5.2 Areas of excess demand 
Municipalities that experience excess demand for childcare are expected to 
exhibit a zero or a positive impact of the voucher on the labour force participation.  
The former result would occur if new users had moved from informal care use to 
private care customers whereas in the latter case the private childcare voucher would 
release previously non-employed mothers to work.  In the data it is possible to 
identify three municipalities within the experiment region that experienced excess 
demand for childcare prior to the voucher experiment.  The following analysis 
includes these three municipalities as the treated while the non-experimental 
municipalities provide a control group.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The results in Table 4 give the impact of the private childcare voucher on LFP, 
PUB and PRIV of the treated group in the areas that experienced excess demand for 
childcare.  The results are reported separately for the mothers of children aged 
between 0-2 and 3-6.  The distributions of propensity scores are reported in Figure 2 
and show somewhat less support at the right-hand tail of the distribution that the 
estimates for the whole country.    
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 [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Similarly to the results for the whole country, the results for the 0-2 year olds are 
insignificant with respect to LFP or the use of either type of care.  The impact on 
PRIV is substantial for the older age group with a significant increase in use of 
between 6-7 percentage points.  The matching is not as good as for the whole 
country; the percentage matched drops to between 90-96% matched.  However, as a 
proportion of the treated observations the support is thicker than previously although 
sample sizes go down considerably.  A weak positive impact on LFP is also found 
with both sets of estimates ranging from 5-7 percentage points.  
The estimates for the areas of excess demand also show the differences between 
the matching methods.  With the Epanechinov kernel (EK), there is a trade-off 
between bias and precision and, as shown with the EK estimates, the variance overall 
is lower than for nearest neighbour.   
Interestingly, EK provides significant positive estimates for the use of public care 
as a result of the private care voucher (8-10 percentage points).  This finding 
supports Epple and Romano (1996), whose theoretical framework predicts that the 
combined public and private use of a good, such as childcare, will be higher under a 
“dual-provision regime” such as analyzed here, than under either alternative.  
However, the results for the whole country reported in Section 6.1 reject their 
prediction.  
As an overall conclusion, the impact of the private care voucher is positive for 
the use of private childcare.  The results regarding labour force participation and use 
of public care are more open to interpretation , however, weighing the pros and cons 
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leads to less weak support for any impact on labour force participation and use of 
public care.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides experimental estimates on labour participation as well as 
public and private childcare use of a switch from a predominantly public childcare 
system to a quasi-market with a voucher for private childcare.   
The main finding is that consumers reacted positively to the introduction of a 
private childcare voucher, moving from informal care use to customers of private 
childcare.  The use of private care increased by 3 to 5 percentage points for older pre-
school age children.  None of the estimates are significant for the 0-2 age group.  
However, since the use of public childcare did not decrease concomitantly, this raises 
some doubts regarding the ability of the private provision to decrease the dead-
weight losses associated with public care provision, at least in the short-run. 
Most likely the increased use of private childcare relieved some previously unmet 
demand for childcare that the public sector could not provide, for example, increased 
flexibility.  This conclusion is supported by findings for areas of the country that 
suffered from excess demand for childcare.  In excess demand areas, the labour force 
participation increased by over 5 percentage points, while public and private 
childcare use increased by 5-9 percentage points each. 
Interestingly, the combined public and private use of childcare is found to be 
higher under a “dual-provision regime” than under either alternative in areas with 
excess demand for childcare, but not in the whole country.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of propensity scores in whole country 
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Figure 2: Distribution of propensity scores in areas of excess demand 
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Table 1: Sample derivation (1994-97) 
 Number of observations 
Original 1994-97 data 29,083 
Drop voucher problem regions 27,676 
Drop households without 0-6 year olds 20,427 
Drop men and children 5,904 
Drop single parents 4,511 
Drop if father not employed 4,355 
Drop 1994 1,525 
Expand data by child aged 0-6 5,126 
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Table 2: Pre-experiment summary statistics (1994)  
 Control G=0 Treated G=1 Difference 
LFP 0.692    (0.462) 0.665   
(0.473) 
 
PUB 0.347    (0.476) 0.417   
(0.494) 
** 
PRIV 0.038    (0.191) 0.115   
(0.320) 
*** 
Age 32.605  (4.874) 32.977 
(4.563) 
** 
Dad’s age 35.622  (5.476) 34.900 
(5.118) 
 
No. of children <7 1.838    (0.870) 1.772   
(0.673) 
 
Age of youngest child 2.200    (1.867) 2.223   
(1.789) 
 
Size of household 4.613    (1.375) 4.297   
(1.017) 
*** 
Mother’s schooling    
Compulsory school 0.106    (0.308) 0.102   
(0.303) 
 
Baccalaureate 0.450    (0.465) 0.366   
(0.482) 
** 
Baccalaureate plus vocational 0.316    (0.465) 0.309   
(0.463) 
 
Bachelors 0.048    (0.213) 0.046   
(0.210) 
 
Masters and above 0.081    (0.270) 0.177   
(0.375) 
*** 
Father’s schooling    
Compulsory school 0.181    (0.385) 0.118   
(0.323) 
*** 
Baccalaureate 0.485    (0.500) 0.348   
(0.476) 
*** 
Baccalaureate plus vocational 0.165    (0.371) 0.156   
(0.378) 
 
Bachelors 0.065    (0.247) 0.100   
(0.310) 
** 
Masters and above 0.104    (0.303) 0.279   
(0.415) 
*** 
Capital region 0.001    (0.030) 0.499   
(0.501) 
*** 
Cities  0.373    (0.484) 0.274   
(0.446) 
*** 
Densely populated municipalities 0.194    (0.396) 0.120   
(0.326) 
*** 
Rural municipalities 0.432    (0.496) 0.107   
(0.310) 
*** 
Unemployment rate 0.213    (0.047) 0.158   
(0.050) 
*** 
Number of observations 1,134 391  
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Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 
5% level and * at 10% level of significance. 
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 Table 3: Propensity score matching estimates for whole country (1995-97) 
 LFP PUB PRIV 
 Age 0-2 Age 3-6 Age 0-2 Age 3-6 Age 0-2  Age3-6  
             
NN 0.1 -0.012 
(0.036) 
[99.83] 
{104} 
 -0.006 
(0.026) 
[99.24]
{164} 
 0.028 
(0.035) 
[99.83] 
{104} 
 0.003 
(0.036) 
[99.24] 
{164} 
 0.019 
(0.015) 
[99.83] 
{104} 
 0.043 
(0.019) 
[99.24]
{164} 
** 
             
NN 0.01 -0.012 
(0.038) 
[97.24] 
{108} 
 -0.006 
(0.026) 
[97.72]
{170} 
 0.021 
(0.034) 
[97.24] 
{108} 
 0.009 
(0.035) 
[97.72] 
{170} 
 0.018 
(0.015) 
[97.24] 
{108} 
 0.039 
(0.018) 
[97.72]
{170} 
** 
             
NN 
0.005 
-0.011 
(0.039) 
[95.17] 
{108} 
 -0.011 
(0.026) 
[95.82]
{176} 
 0.018 
(0.033) 
[95.17] 
{108} 
 0.013 
(0.034) 
[95.82] 
{176} 
 0.018 
(0.015) 
[95.17] 
{108} 
 0.030 
(0.018) 
[95.82]
{176} 
* 
             
EK 0.1 -0.009 
(0.023) 
 -0.009 
(0.018)
 0.004 
(0.024)
 0.010 
(0.021)
 0.014 
(0.011) 
 0.051 
(0.013)
***
             
EK 0.01 -0.014 
(0.025) 
 -0.008 
(0.020)
 0.005 
(0.025)
 0.003 
(0.021)
 0.005 
(0.012) 
 0.050 
(0.015)
***
             
EK 
0.005 
-0.012 
(0.027) 
 -0.005 
(0.020)
 0.012 
(0.025)
 0.011 
(0.022)
 0.004 
(0.013) 
 0.038 
(0.015)
** 
N 2,006  3,120  2,006  3,120  2,006  3,120  
T 580  790  580  790  580  790  
Note: LFP: labour force participation. PUB: use of public childcare. PRIV: use of 
private childcare. NN: nearest neighbour. EK: Epanechnikov kernel. N: 
number of observations. T: number of treated observations. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors obtained by bootstrapping (100 
replications). *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 
10% level of significance. Percentage of treated observations matched to a 
control observation in square brackets. Number of control observations 
responsible for 50% of matches in curly brackets. 
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Table 4: Propensity score matching estimates for areas of excess demand (1995-97) 
 LFP PUB PRIV 
 Age 0-2 Age 3-6 Age 0-2 Age 3-6 Age 0-2  Age3-6  
             
NN 
0.1 
-0.033 
(0.042) 
[100.00]
{48} 
 0.065 
(0.037) 
[96.72] 
{77} 
* -0.030 
(0.050) 
[100.00] 
{48} 
 0.063 
(0.053) 
[96.72] 
{77} 
 0.000 
(0.020) 
[100.00] 
{48} 
 0.073 
(0.026) 
[96.72]
{77} 
***
             
NN 
0.01 
-0.018 
(0.045) 
[93.65] 
{57} 
 0.068 
(0.038) 
[93.18] 
{83} 
* -0.011 
(0.043) 
[93.65] 
{57} 
 0.070 
(0.051) 
[93.18] 
{83} 
 -0.004 
(0.022) 
[93.65] 
{57} 
 0.065 
(0.025) 
[93.18]
{83} 
***
             
NN 
0.005 
-0.035 
(0.048) 
[86.29] 
{64} 
 0.056 
(0.039) 
[89.39] 
{89} 
 -0.019 
(0.040) 
[86.29] 
{64} 
 0.073 
(0.051) 
[89.39] 
{89} 
 -0.012 
(0.024) 
[86.29] 
{64} 
 0.062 
(0.026) 
[89.39]
{89} 
** 
             
EK 
0.1 
0.018 
(0.027) 
 0.052 
(0.025) 
** 0.016 
(0.039) 
 0.095 
(0.030)
*** 0.018 
(0.014) 
 0.063 
(0.021)
***
             
EK 
0.01 
0.036 
(0.032) 
 0.052 
(0.029) 
* 0.030 
(0.038) 
 0.080 
(0.032)
** 0.020 
(0.015) 
 0.061 
(0.019)
***
             
EK 
0.005 
0.029 
(0.035) 
 0.038 
(0.027) 
 0.028 
(0.036) 
 0.085 
(0.030)
*** 0.010 
(0.017) 
 0.059 
(0.020)
***
N 1,721  2,718  1,721  2,718  1,721  2,718  
T 299  396  299  396  299  396  
Note: LFP: labour force participation. PUB: use of public childcare. PRIV: use of 
private childcare. NN: nearest neighbour. EK: Epanechnikov kernel. N: 
number of observations. T: number of treated observations. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors obtained by bootstrapping (100 
replications). *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 
10% level of significance. Percentage of treated observations matched to a 
control observation in square brackets. Number of control observations 
responsible for 50% of matches in curly brackets. 
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